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Introduction
Education is an important factor in modern societies. From a societal perspective,
education can serve to maintain and enhance prosperity and growth, and estimates of returns to
education are therefore of central interest to policymakers hoping to expand the educational system
in light of anticipated returns. From an individual perspective, education can potentially improve
skills and knowledge, which, in turn, if used to raise productivity, increases chances of employment
opportunities and can be converted into higher wages, but a sudden change in the educational
system or at the labor market may have an affect even in very prosperous sectors of the labor
market. An exogenous shock in the supply of structural engineers is empirically identified, and we
find that wage is sensitive to the relative supply of engineers.
Since the pioneering work of Becker (1962, 1964/1993) and Mincer (1958, 1962,
1974), who formulated the now-standard Human Capital Earnings Function, which explains
individual wage as a function of education and labor market experience, an abundance of empirical
studies have confirmed the relationship between education and labor market returns (Card 1999).
College graduates command higher wages, experience less unemployment, and secure better jobs
than their less educated counterparts (Hout 2012). A surge of research on the returns to college
education have carefully and often ingeniously addressed whether this result holds in the presence
of various challenges to the exogenous selection assumption (also known as the no-confounding
assumption). These studies use various research design features to mitigate the effect of nonrandom selection on unobservable factors, such as individual-level innate ability – including twin
studies and sibling fixed effects (Angrist and Krueger 1991; Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; Altonji
and Dunn 1996; Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman 1996; Ashenfelter and Rouse 1998; Rouse
1999; Duflo 2001; Heckman and Vytlacil 2001). However, studies typically uphold the stable-unittreatment-value assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin 1980, 1990). The SUTVA implies that the potential
outcomes for a given individual do not vary with the treatment assigned to other individuals
(Morgan and Winship 2015, 48). Accordingly, the causal effect of a particular college education on
labor market outcomes cannot be a function of the other individuals receiving that same education
(Imbens and Rubin 2015). Clearly, this assumption is problematic because there is likely to be
interference between individuals, given that college graduates compete in the labor market. Thus, if
sufficiently large numbers enroll in the same graduate program, thereby increasing the supply of
suitable candidates within that particular skill group, the competition for jobs will increase,
resulting in a lower price of labor within that skill group; consequently, employment rates and
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wages drop. This is also known as a general equilibrium effect, as opposed to a partial equilibrium
effect, which is typically what is estimated with a variant of the standard earnings function.
In general, estimating the returns to college education with the standard earnings
function (under the SUTVA) is incompatible with the demand and supply model, which predicts
that a larger relative net supply of a particular skill group will negatively affect their relative wage.
Conversely, a smaller relative net supply of a particular skill group will affect their wage positively
(Katz and Autor 1999; Katz and Murphy 1992). If this is the case, the SUTVA is violated because
the returns to a particular college education for an individual depend on other individuals receiving
that same college education. Accordingly, a clear drawback of the standard earnings function is that
it ignores basic demand and supply factors (Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and Todd 1996, 563). This is
problematic because previous empirical studies show that wages respond to the supply of skilled
labor (Fallon and Layard 1975; Angrist 1995; Johnson 1997; Topel 1997; Card and Lemieux 2001).
Empirical evidence in favor of the demand and supply model include a study by Angrist (1995) that
uses a natural experiment with rapid educational expansion in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from
1981 to 1991 to study how a swiftly increasing supply of skilled labor affects the wage premium for
highly skilled labor. Interestingly, the study provides evidence that the rapid expansion of higher
education lowered the wage premium of highly skilled labor from 1981 to 1988, thus showing that a
rapid increase in the supply of skilled labor can decrease the returns to education.
In this paper, we use high-quality Danish register data and exploit a natural
experiment in a part of the closed Danish labor market, where the supply of structural engineers
spiked following the opening of a new university to examine supply effects. Here, we follow studies
that have investigated whether and to what extent returns to college education vary by type
(Grogger and Eide 1995; Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg 1999; Light and Strayer 2004). In the mid1970s, a new university, Aalborg University (AAU), was founded in Denmark and offered
predominantly engineering programs. As we later show, this event created a sudden exogenous
increase in the supply of structural engineers in the mid-1980s. Accordingly, if supply effects are
important for returns to education, recently graduated structural engineers should experience a drop
in wages and employment rates because of the exogenous increase in the supply of structural
engineers. Given that Aalborg University did not have a chemical engineering program at that time,
we use chemical engineers as a control group. We find that the wages of structural engineers and, to
some extent, their employment rates dropped in and around 1984, with the most marked effect in
1984, as the supply of structural engineers peaked. This finding provides evidence that a sudden
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exogenous increase in the supply of a particular skill group in high demand can negatively affect the
returns to that particular education.
The case of engineers may be of particular interest as engineer’s educations are part of
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education. STEM is believed to play
key part in competitiveness and future economic prosperity (Wendler et al. 2010; Klein, Rice, and
Levy 2012). As such, STEM educations are believed to be in excess demand (Goldin and Katz
2008; Lacey and Wright 2009) and therefore not very sensitive to supply side effects. Our study
makes two key contributions to the literature on returns to college education. First, we follow
Angrist (1995) and show that wage is responsive to supply and that contextual factors thus matter to
the return to education. Second, we add to the study of Angrist (1995) by showing that wages of
educational groups, i.e., engineers, who are expected to be in high demand, c.f. Wilson (2009), are
also susceptible to supply effects. In this respect, we add to the discussion of the importance of
general equilibrium effects when estimating the returns to education (Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and
Todd 1996).
In order to mitigate the potential quality of student bias, which might arise if lowerability students self-select into the additional student places created by AAU’s opening, we estimate
individual fixed effects models as an addition to ordinary least squares (OLS) models. Fixed effects
models control for time-invariant baseline differences between individuals, such as innate ability.
The fixed effects models and the OLS models provide very similar results, and we are thus satisfied
that the results could not be generated by differences in students’ quality.
Moreover, to alleviate bias for the quality of education, which might arise if, for the
time the immature AAU provided a substandard education, we estimated separate models solely for
Technical University of Denmark (DTU) engineers following studies that have investigated whether
quality matters to the returns to college education, that is, whether the returns of attending highly
selective or elite colleges are larger than those of attending less selective colleges (Dale and
Krueger 2002; Dale and Krueger 2014). Using only structural and chemical engineers from DTU,
which arguably did not change its quality during the period of investigation, we still find evidence
of a wage drop in and around 1984.
Finally, we investigate whether the wage drop is sensitive to heterogeneous effects of
social background, possibly showing a social gradient. We find that the effect of the exogenous
supply shock is relatively insensitive to social background, providing evidence that structural
change in the supply of skilled labor affects candidates from all social backgrounds.
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section II more formally describes the SUTVA in the
context of the returns to a college degree. Section III outlines the background of the study and
explains how we use the opening of AAU to conduct a natural experiment. Section IV discusses
data and variables. Section V describes the empirical strategy, which allows us to identify the effect
of the exogenous supply shock of structural engineers. Section VI presents the results. Section VII
concludes.

Returns to a college degree and the SUTVA
When estimating the returns to education under the SUTVA, it is assumed that the potential wages
and employment rates of individual i cannot depend on whether another individual j receives an
education. As previously explained, this situation is incompatible with the standard earnings
function that does not account for demand and supply effects because we expect that the wage
individual i is able to command is dependent on the supply of graduates who are able to perform
individual i’s profession. Consequently, if the market is temporally oversupplied with suitable
candidates for individual i’s profession, we expect it to negatively affect the wage individual i is
able to command. Thus, because the potential outcome for individual i is likely to be a function of
the number of individuals receiving an education, the SUTVA effectively breaks down.
To illustrate this problem more formally, define a vector, d, which is an N × 1 vector
of treatment indicator variables for N. Furthermore, define the potential outcomes of each individual
as functions across all elements of vector d. Therefore, the outcome for individual i under treatment
is

, and the outcome under the control is

. The causal effect of interest can then be

defined as follows:

The SUTVA is the assumption that

, and

. Consequently, the

SUTVA breaks down if individual-level causal effects vary with the treatment assigned to other
units, that is, if

, and

. In our case, in a sample of n individuals, we expect

the returns to a particular college education to decrease as | | → n, that is, as a larger share of
individuals choose that particular college education. In other words, as more individuals are
assigned to a treatment, the effectiveness of the treatment (here: college engineering education)
decreases, clearly violating SUTVA. Note that the above notation does not take into account any
assignment ordering. If this ordering is dependent on a particular factor, e.g., ability, then the
average treatment effect depends on the ordering at which individuals are sorted into the treatment.
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In this case, SUTVA also depends on the particular ordering. To take account of ability-ordering
effects, we employ a fixed effects regression below.

Background: The opening of Aalborg University as a natural experiment
Before the opening of Aalborg University, the only place to receive an engineering
master degree was the Polytechnic University, which was founded in 1829 and is located in
Denmark’s capital, Copenhagen. Later, the Polytechnic University changed its name to the
Technical University of Denmark (DTU), which is how it is known today. Initially, the school
offered two types of engineering programs – Chemical Engineering and Mechanical Engineering. In
1857, Structural Engineering was added, and in 1903, Electro-technical Engineering was added,
completing the list of the four traditional types of engineering. From 1829 to 1974, DTU was the
only place to receive an engineering master degree in Denmark. Thus, “Master of Engineering”
(cand.polyt.) was a generic term for candidates from DTU stipulated as a five-year program.
However, in 1957, the Danish Engineering Academy (DEA) was founded, and opened
a department in Aalborg in 1966. DEA offered only undergraduate programs, or Bachelors of
Engineering, which in Denmark are now known as “Diploma engineers”1. However, in 1974, AAU
was founded with DEA as an important component, and beginning in 1974, AAU offered an MA
program in engineering, thus becoming the first institution of higher education in Denmark apart
from DTU to train “Masters of Engineering”. The fact that there were now two institutions of
higher education offering MAs in engineering resulted in an increase in the supply of engineers in
the mid-1980s.
The first MAs in engineering from AAU graduated in the early 1980s. It was not until
the mid-1980s that the supply of structural engineers momentarily boosted. This was due to a
buildup of a student body delaying their enrollment awaiting the opening of the MA engineering
program at AAU. In addition, the reason for the relative long time span from the opening of the MA
program to the boost in number of candidates was because an MA in engineering in the 1970-1980s
took on average about 1 - 3 more years of study than the formally stipulated five-year program.
AAU did not educate all types of engineers from the beginning; in fact, the university
trained only structural engineers until the mid-1980s. In 1984, it began training other types of
engineers as well, but importantly, it did not train chemical engineers before the mid-1990s.
1

A “Diploma in Engineering” is a shorter, more practically oriented education than that of a Master of Engineering.
Diploma engineers are composed of two types of practical engineers known in Denmark as Academy engineers
(akademiingeniører) and Technikum engineers (Teknikumingeniører).
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Therefore, we can construct a natural experiment. Because the opening of AAU significantly
increased the supply of structural engineers and did not change the supply of chemical engineers,
we assume that structural engineers are treated with the exogenous supply shock, while chemical
engineers form a valid control group because they should be unaffected by a supply shock of
structural engineers. Furthermore, we assume that, conditional on baseline differences between
structural engineers and chemical engineers, as well as year-to-year fluctuations, the wage
development of structural and chemical engineers would have shown similar patterns in the absence
of an exogenous shock to the supply of structural engineers.
Although, as argued above, we can reasonably form a treatment and control group, a
challenge to the design is that we do not control the exact timing of treatment. However, when we
look at the supply of structural and chemical engineers in greater detail, we discover that the supply
of structural engineers shows a spike in 1984. Figure 1 shows the supply of structural and chemical
engineers from AAU and DTU from 1981 to 1991.

***** Figure 1 about here *****

From Figure 1, it is evident that the supply of structural engineers shows a spike in 1984, in
particular candidates from AAU (highlighted in the figure), while the supply of chemical engineers
goes in the other direction. What we observe is a momentary boost in 1984 resulting from a
graduation wave of several cohorts of students that attended the new AAU in the late 1970’s
typically spending more than 5 years of study to obtain their MA degree. Accordingly, given that
supply effects are important, we should see a marked difference between wages and employment
rates of structural and chemical engineers around 1984.
The 1984 boost is naturally followed by a period of waiting time before a new wave of
engineers enters the labor resulting in an additional spike in the supply of structural engineers in
1988-1989; however, around this year, the supply of chemical engineers also increased, which made
this year a less clear-cut case for studying supply effects and, in addition, the demand for engineers
is decreasing in that period2.

2

The demand for engineers is generally high, also in the years from 1979 to 1991 with some of the lowest
unemployment rates among graduates. Official Statistics shows that the general rates of unemployment of engineers
compared to other occupational groups lie between 2.3 and 4.2 percent in the period 1979-1988 (3.3 percent in 1984,
and 2.6, 2.5 and 3.2 percent in the following three years) and rising to 4.8-7.3 in 1989-1991. This also applies when
using the average degree of unemployment over the year (cf. Statistics Denmark 1985, 1990, 1992).
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Data, variables and empirical strategy
For the analyses, we use high-quality register data from Denmark collected annually by Statistics
Denmark. In Denmark, all residents have a unique personal identification number, which makes it
possible to merge information from several different administrative registers. Information on wages
and employment rates is obtained from employers and is normally used for administrative tax
purposes. Information on education is collected from educational institutions. Accordingly, we are
able to create a sample containing all MAs in structural and chemical engineering who received
their degrees in the period from 1979 to 1991. However, in the regression analysis we choose to
limit our sample to a six-year group (1979-1985) for two reasons. First, we believe that structural
engineers at risk of being affected by the supply shock in the mid-1980s had to graduate before the
supply shock occurred. Second, high-quality information on the labor market experience was not
available in the registers until 1980. Failing to measure labor market experience accurately could
severely bias the results because certain engineers from DTU will have more years of experience.
The impact of supply shock is evaluated by looking at wages and rates of employment
in the 1981-1991 period. Since we use register data, we avoid measurement error due to selfreporting3. Moreover, full information on wages is available, i.e., wages are not top-coded, as is
often the case with U.S. data. Furthermore, since the administrative registers contain information on
everyone living in Denmark, we do not risk wage-selective attrition, which might arise in survey
data.
Wages are measured as the yearly taxable wage, including fringe benefits and
severance pay. If an individual had not graduated in the year of observation, the individual’s wage
is set to missing – even if he or she had an observable wage – in order to avoid bias from observing
student job wages or similar wages that bias wage estimates downwards.
Rate of employment is measured as the inverted rate of unemployment per mille, i.e.,
the rate of employment

1000

where U is net unemployment during the work year per

mille excluding holidays, and W is the number of weeks in the work year excluding the number of
holiday weeks in the relevant year. The variable takes on values from 0-1000 in each year.

3

Although there is no measurement error due to self-reporting, measurement error in the graduation year cannot be
ruled out entirely, as educational institutions report to Statistics Denmark.
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Our basic OLS regression model controls for gender, labor market experience, and
social background. The latter is measured by whether at least one parent has some college education
or whether both have no college education. Labor market experience is approximated from
information on pension payments and is measured per mille. We have divided this measure of labor
market experience by 1,000 to avoid scaling problems in the models.
We use a limited set of controls because we also estimate individual fixed effects
models that effectively sweep out all baseline observed and unobserved differences between
individuals, including innate ability.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the structural and chemical engineers. The
differences between structural engineers and chemical engineers in terms of wage and employment
rates are negligible. However, most of the differences are statistically significant due to the large
sample sizes. The largest differences between the two groups are that a larger proportion of
chemical engineers are female and have parent(s) with college education.

**** Table 1 about here ****

Empirical strategy
In order to empirically examine the effect of the sudden increase in the supply of structural
engineers in and around 1984 on their relative wages and employment rates, we follow Angrist
(1995) and use an augmented earnings function that allows the returns to education to depend on the
timing of graduation. Since the supply of structural engineers peaked in and around 1984, this
should cause their wage and employment rates to drop relative to those of chemical engineers in
exactly this period.
In order to identify this effect, we assume that, except for baseline differences and
year-to-year fluctuations, structural engineers’ and chemical engineers’ wages and employment
rates would have developed in a similar pattern in the absence of changes in the supply of structural
engineers. We find this assumption reasonable because AAU did not train chemical engineers
during the period of study. Accordingly, the control group, chemical engineers, did not experience
any unusual changes in supply during the period of study. If we further invoke the exogenous
selection assumption, we can identify the effect of the increased supply shock of structural
engineers with equation 1:
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(1) ln

∙

∙

∙

′

where i indexes individuals and t indexes time; Ln(y)it is the natural log of wage standardized to
1991 DKK, and the log of employment rates, respectively.

is a time fixed effect absorbing wage

and employment rate variation, which is the result of year-to-year fluctuations;
equal to 1 if individual i is a structural engineer, and
interaction term

∙

chemical engineers,

is an indicator

is the corresponding coefficient. The

captures wage deviations across time for structural engineers compared to
is a vector of individual characteristics that affect wages and employment

rates (labor market experience, gender and social background), and
The coefficients of interest are the vector of coefficients,
varying effect of being a structural engineer. For t = 1984,

is an error term.
, which identifies the time-

measures the impact of the increased

supply of structural engineers in 1984 using chemical engineers as a control group. For t < 1985,
provides misspecification checks or potentially anticipatory effects. For t > 1985,

provides

misspecification checks or potentially lagged effects.
One might argue, however, that the exogenous selection assumption is likely to be violated.
This situation arises if engineers with higher unobserved ability choose to study at DTU because it
is a mature institution with a good reputation, whereas engineers with low unobserved ability
choose AAU because it is (was) a new and untested institution and therefore assumed to be “easier”
to graduate from. In order to make the exogenous selection assumption more credible, we add
individual fixed effects to equation 1:
(2) ln

where

∙

∙

′

are individual fixed effects that absorb unobserved time-invariant differences between

individuals, which affect wages and employment rates. The vector

is now composed only of

labor market experience because gender and social background are time-invariant and hence
included in

. Note also that

is also time-invariant and is consequently included only when

interacting with time.
If we find that structural engineers earn smaller wages and have lower employment rates
than chemical engineers around the supply shock, conditional on year-to-year fluctuations and
individual characteristics, one might still argue that this result arises only because structural
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engineers from AAU received their diplomas from a new and untested institution without DTU’s
reputation. This is equivalent to arguing that the supply shock would affect only the wage and
employment rates of structural engineers from AAU, not those of structural engineers from DTU.
Therefore, we exclude engineers from AAU and re-estimate equation 2 only with engineers from
DTU to check whether engineers from DTU remain unaffected by the increased supply shock.
Finally, we might expect that the effect of the supply shock will have heterogeneous effects
and therefore a social gradient, so we expect that the supply shock of structural engineers will have
a stronger negative impact on wages and employment rates of structural engineers with parents
without a history of college education. To test this notion, we re-estimate equation 2 separately for
individuals who have at least one parent with a college education.
As a robustness check we also conduct the analysis as a difference in difference analysis.

Results

Table 2 provides OLS regression estimates for equation 1, controlling for gender, parent(s) with
some college education and labor market experience.

**** Table 2 here ****

Table 2 provides clear evidence of a marked decline in wages for structural engineers compared to
chemical engineers in 1984. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term between the indicator
of being a structural engineer and the year 1984 is -0.18 (0.05) in the baseline model and -0.19
(0.05) when control variables are added; both estimates are significant at the 1% level. Table 2 also
provides evidence of smaller declines in wages in the years up to 1984, and the following year of
1985. This result suggests that the increased supply of structural engineers already began to impact
the returns to education in 1982. However, the impact was strongest in 1984 as the supply of new
candidates from AAU peaked, and lost its importance thereafter as the supply of structural
engineers declined in both absolute and relative terms.
We then ask whether some groups are more or less affected by the sudden increase in the supply of
engineers. In order to check for heterogeneous effects, we controlled for social background. We
measure this dummy variable as parents with some college education, completed in either university
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colleges or universities, or no college education. The estimates (not shown, but part of the control
variables) are small and insignificant (-0.01), so, apparently, the wage drop and the insignificant
decrease in employment rate do not show a social gradient. We find that the effect of the exogenous
supply shock is relatively insensitive to social background.

Individual fixed effects – eliminating quality of student bias
A source of bias in OLS estimation of equation 1 is the quality of students. If lower-ability students
tried their luck in the newly opened AAU, the effects of the increased supply of structural engineers
would be exaggerated because lower-ability students would have earned lower wages and suffered
lower employment rates even in the absence of an exogenous supply shock. To eliminate this source
of bias, we use individual fixed effects estimations, as in equation 2. Since fixed effects estimates
are used only within individual variation, and thus control for all observed and unobserved, timeinvariant baseline differences between individuals, fixed effects estimates will be consistent even in
the presence of unobserved differences in quality of students. Table 3 provides results from the
fixed effects estimation.

*** Table 3 here ****
The results are very similar to OLS estimates in Table 2, suggesting that the unobserved quality of
students cannot explain the sudden decrease in wages observed for structural engineers in 1984.
However, this may not be very surprising because we study a dynamic relationship across time that
is likely unrelated to individual attributes. Many important individual attributes are time invariant
and therefore also unrelated to time-varying factors, such as the relative supply of structural
engineers.
Furthermore, the fixed effects estimates in Table 3 provide evidence of a decrease in
employment rates around 1984 and 1985, although these negative effects are not large enough to be
significant.
Rather than using time dummies, one could use the supply of structural engineers
relative to that of chemical engineers as explanatory variables. We have also tried this combination
both for OLS and fixed effects regressions. We find that the relative supply of structural engineers
has the expected negative sign, and the effect is almost significant at the 5% level. However, it
seems obvious that this approach is less efficient than using time dummies interacted with the
supply of structural engineers, as in Tables 2 and 3. As mentioned above, we believe that the reason
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why time dummies are more efficient than the relative supply is that the relative supply shows too
little variation over and above the supply “shock” in and around 1984. We have also tried to use the
relative supply rather than time dummies (results are available upon request), finding similar results
but a significantly worse fit.
As mentioned we have also formulated our model as a difference in difference estimation
where we choose a treatment dummy for structural engineers and three period dummies equal to
pre-treatment (1981-1983), treatment (1984) and post-treatment (1985-1991) periods. We
parametrize the periods in this way, because we expect that the post treatment period is
heterogeneous in terms of supply for both structural and chemical engineer’s and because we
believe supply side effects to be short lived.
Results are reported in Table A1 in the appendix. Results are a little more efficient
compared to the results in Tables 2 and 3 but strikingly similar.

Individual fixed effects with DTU engineers only – eliminating quality of education bias
Although fixed effects estimation eliminates baseline differences in quality of students, which
might bias the results, another source of bias is differences in the quality of education. An
explanation for the results in Table 2 might be that AAU provided students with a lower-quality
education, decreasing wages and employment. If this were the case, we would expect that only
structural engineers from AAU would have been affected because they had a lower-quality
education than that offered by DTU.
To eliminate this potential source of bias, we re-estimate the fixed effects excluding
structural engineers from AAU. Table 4 provides results from fixed effects estimation with
structural and chemical engineers from DTU.

**** Table 4 here ****
.

Although the coefficients of -0.13 and 0.14 in the controlled model are slightly
smaller than previous estimates, these results document that structural engineers from DTU were
not unaffected by the increased supply of structural engineers created by the opening of AAU.
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Table 4 also shows positive estimates for employment rates in 1982 and 1983, indicating a demand
for structural engineers.

Is the supply effect socially heterogeneous?

Again, we ask whether some candidates are exempted from the sudden increase in the supply of
engineers, which could be the case if networks play a role or if some groups can better afford to
wait for the right job. In other words, we are testing more for heterogeneous effects. To do so, we
ran a model with another specification in which parental education is interacted with the two
dependent variables, but we do not find a social gradient. Until 1984, the supply of structural
engineers is increasing. Table 5 shows that structural engineers with parents without a college
education experience a negative effect on their wages in 1982 (with a small fluctuation) and in
1984; likewise, structural engineers with parents with college education experience a negative effect
in 1984 and 1985. We find that the negative effect of the increased supply of structural engineers
appears for both groups in 1984 and then at staggering times; however, both groups are affected. All
in all, there does not seem to be a social gradient. Later in time, the estimates are positive for both
wages and employment for both groups.

**** Table 5 here ****

Conclusion
The primary contribution of this paper is that it provides evidence that, if a larger share of graduates
from the same graduate program, the returns to that particular college degree will decrease, at least
in the short run. We argue that a plausible explanation for this finding is that, if sufficiently large
numbers of new engineers enters the labor market providing a saturation effect, even when in high
demand, the supply of suitable candidates strongly increases, and, consequently, competition for
jobs increases; this results in a lower price of labor within that skill group and, consequently, lower
wages.
A more general interpretation of our findings is that individual-level estimates of
returns to a particular college degree should be extrapolated with caution because interference
between individuals on the labor market can cause returns to decrease as many more individuals
earn the same degree. Here, we follow Angrist (1995, p. 1084), who uses a rapidly expanding
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education system in the West Bank and Gaza strip in 1981-1991 to argue “…that contemporaneous
schooling coefficients can be a poor indicator of the ultimate economic value of additional
schooling when large numbers of new graduates enter the labor market”. We extend this finding by
showing that returns to a particular college degree can also decrease as an increasing supply of
candidates within that particular skill group enters the labor market. In that sense, we find a general
equilibrium effect. Policymakers should be aware of this adverse effect of expanding certain fields
of study; otherwise, they risk making misguided decisions based on individual-level estimates of
returns, which are likely to change as a consequence of increasing student intake.

It should be noted that we study engineers who are generally in high demand. In other fields of
study, decreasing returns might be even larger or their effects prolonged.
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Figure 1: The supply of structural and chemical engineers in each year from AAU and DTU. Period
1981-1991.
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Note: Years of observations are represented by the x-axis and the number of graduated engineers is represented by the
y-axis. The period of 1981-1991 is the observation period we are looking at wage and job effects.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Difference
in means
(t-test)

Structural engineers (treatment
group)

Chemical engineers (control group)

OBS

Mean

SD

OBS

Mean

SD

Wage

5726

284782.30

105546

3219

290466

109819.70

*

Employment rate

5875

965.78

113.91

3263

972.66

107.92

**

AAU (versus DTU)

5886

0.54

-

3266

-

-

**

Female
Labor market
experience

5886

0.08

-

3266

0.20

-

**

5886

4.54

2.84

3266

4.94

Parent(s) with college
5886
0.38
3266
0.51
Note: *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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2.94

**

-

**

Table 2: Initial results from OLS. Structural and chemical engineers. Period 1981-1991.
LN(wage)

Dependent variable:
Structural engineer × 1981
Structural engineer × 1982
Structural engineer × 1983
Structural engineer × 1984
Structural engineer × 1985
Structural engineer × 1986
Structural engineer × 1987
Structural engineer × 1988

LN(rate of employment [RoE])

0.05

0.01

-0.00

-0.01

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.04)

(0.04)

-0.11

-0.15

-0.01

-0.01

(0.09)

(0.08)

(0.04)

(0.04)

-0.03

-0.07

-0.00

-0.01

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.18**

-0.19**

-0.01

-0.01

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.04

-0.03

-0.01

-0.01

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.03

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.04

0.04

0.02

0.02

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.05

0.04

0.01

0.01

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.05

0.04

-0.01

-0.01

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Year fixed effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Control variables

NO

YES

NO

YES

Structural engineer × 1989
Structural engineer × 1990

Observations
8945
8945
9138
9138
Note: Control variables include education institution, gender, parent(s) with some college education, and labor market
experience. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are displayed in parentheses. *, ** indicate statistical
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 1991 is the baseline year.
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Table 3: Individual fixed effects regressions. Structural and chemical engineers. Period 1981-1991.
LN(wage)

Dependent variable:
Structural engineer × 1981
Structural engineer × 1982
Structural engineer × 1983
Structural engineer × 1984
Structural engineer × 1985
Structural engineer × 1986
Structural engineer × 1987
Structural engineer × 1988

LN(RoE)

-0.00

0.01

-0.01

-0.00

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.15

-0.16

0.00

-0.00

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.08

-0.08

0.00

0.00

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.20**

-0.20**

-0.01

-0.01

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.05

-0.05

-0.02

-0.02

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.03

0.03

0.02

0.02

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.03

0.03

0.02

0.02

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.04

0.04

0.02

0.02

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.05

0.05

0.01

0.01

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.04

0.04

-0.01

-0.01

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Year fixed effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Control variables

NO

YES

NO

YES

Structural engineer × 1989
Structural engineer × 1990

Observations
8945
8945
9138
9138
Note: Control variables include labor market experience. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are displayed
in parentheses. *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 1991 is the baseline year.

21

Table 4: Fixed effects regressions. Structural and chemical engineers from DTU. Period 1981-1991.
Dependent variable:
Structural engineer × 1981
Structural engineer × 1982
Structural engineer × 1983
Structural engineer × 1984
Structural engineer × 1985
Structural engineer × 1986
Structural engineer × 1987
Structural engineer × 1988
Structural engineer × 1989
Structural engineer × 1990

LN(wage)

LN(RoE)

0.13

0.13

0.05

0.05

(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.00

-0.00

0.08*

0.08*

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.05

0.04

0.06*

0.06*

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.13*

-0.14**

0.02

0.02

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.10

-0.10

-0.01

-0.01

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.03

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.01

0.00

0.02

0.02

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.02

0.02

0.03

0.03

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.04

0.03

0.02

0.02

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.04

0.03

-0.01

-0.02

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Year fixed effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Controls

NO

YES

NO

YES

Observations

5875
5875
5974
5974
Note: Control variables include: labor market experience. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are displayed
in parenthesis. *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 1991 is the baseline year.
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Table 5: Fixed-effects regressions. Structural and chemical engineers from DTU and AAU.
Separate models according to social background. Period 1981-1991.
Parent(s) without college

Structural engineer ×
1981
Structural engineer ×
1982

Parent(s) with college
Ln(RoE)
Ln(wage) Ln(wage)
Ln(RoE)

Ln(wage) Ln(wage)

Ln(RoE) Ln(RoE)

0.01

0.01

0.04

0.05

0.03

0.02

-0.05

-0.05

(0.18)

(0.18)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.04)

(0.04)

-0.26*

-0.26*

-0.03

-0.03

0.01

0.01

0.04

0.04

(0.10)

(0.10)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.13)

(0.12)

(0.05)

(0.05)

Structural engineer ×
1983

-0.08

-0.08

-0.01

-0.01

-0.09

-0.09

0.02

0.02

(0.08)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.10)

(0.10)

(0.04)

(0.04)

Structural engineer ×
1984

(0.08)
0.21***

-0.21***

-0.03

-0.03

-0.18*

-0.17*

0.00

0.00

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.05)

(0.05)

0.05

0.05

0.02

0.02

-0.19**

-0.18**

-0.06

-0.06

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.04)

(0.04)

0.06

0.06

0.04*

0.04*

-0.01

0.00

-0.00

-0.00

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.07

0.07

0.03

0.03

-0.01

-0.00

0.01

0.01

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.05

0.05

0.03

0.03

0.02

0.01

-0.00

-0.00

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.04)

0.04

0.03

0.03

0.02

0.06

0.06

-0.01

-0.01

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.00

-0.00

-0.01

-0.01

0.08

0.08

-0.01

-0.01

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Structural engineer ×
1985
Structural engineer ×
1986
Structural engineer ×
1987
Structural engineer ×
1988
Structural engineer ×
1989
Structural engineer ×
1990
Year fixed effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Control variables

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

N
5138
5138
5246
5246
3807
3807
3892
3892
Note: Control variables include labor market experience. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are displayed
in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 1991 is the baseline year.
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Appendix. Difference in difference analysis.

Table A1. Difference in difference analysis.
LN(wage)

Dependent variable:

LN(RoE)

Treatment (1984)

0.38**
(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Post (1985-1991)

0.80**

0.42**

0.09**

0.07**

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.01)

(0.01)

-0.20**

-0.20**

-0.01

-0.01

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.03)

NO

YES

NO

YES

Structural × Treatment (1984)
Control variables

0.27**

0.03

0.02

Observations
8945
8945
9138
9138
Note: Control variables include labor market experience. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are displayed
in parentheses. *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Pretreatment (1981-1983) is
the baseline period.
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